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Sleep and Dreaming in  
the Predictive Processing Framework
Alessio Bucci & Matteo Grasso
Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing 
attention from both the scientific and the philosophical communities. The in-
creasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science aims to 
give a full account of all aspects of cognition. The aim of this paper is to critically 
assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by 
Clark 2013, Clark 2016; and Hohwy 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming.
After a brief introduction, we overview the state of the art at the intersection be-
tween dream research and PP (with particular reference to Hobson and Friston 
2012; Hobson et al. 2014). In the following sections we focus on two theoretically 
promising aspects of the research program.
First, we consider the explanations of phenomenal consciousness during sleep 
(i.e. dreaming) and how it arises from the neural work of the brain. PP provides a 
good picture of the peculiarity of dreaming but it can’t fully address the problem 
of how consciousness comes to be in the first place. We propose that Integrated 
Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) is a good candi-
date for this role and we will show its advantages and points of contact with PP.
After introducing IIT, we deal with the evolutionary function of sleeping and 
dreaming. We illustrate that PP fits with contemporary researches on the im-
portant adaptive function of sleep and we discuss why IIT can account for sleep 
mentation (i.e. dreaming) in evolutionary terms (Albantakis et al. 2014).
In the final section, we discuss two future avenues for dream research that can 
fruitfully adopt the perspective offered by PP: (a) the role of bodily predictions 
in the constitution of the sleeping brain activity and the dreaming experience, 
and (b) the precise role of the difference stages of sleep (REM (Rapid eye move-
ment), NREM (Non-rapid eye movement)) in the constitution and refinement of 
the predictive machinery. 
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1  Introduction
Dreaming is a fundamental aspect of our mental activity. We spend almost one-third of our life sleep-
ing, and a good portion of that time dreaming. We often report dreaming experiences upon awak-
ening, and they can have a huge impact on our daily life. Dreaming has also been an object of philo-
sophical investigations, representing a conundrum for our theories on the nature of reality and for the 
accuracy and reliability of perception.
In spite of this, not so much has been written about dreaming in either the philosophical or the sci-
entific literature until the 20th century. Since the discovery of REM sleep in the early 1950s (Aserinsky 
and Kleitman 1953), there has been in fact an increasing interest for the topic in psychology and phi-
losophy. The research on REM sleep has sparked a proliferation of theories about dreaming, although 
it is now fairly established that dreams can happen at any stage of sleep (Nielsen 2000).
On the scientific side, authors are divided in their theoretical proposals on the topic, in particular 
regarding the explananda of their research. A first group of theories concerns the neural underpin-
ning of dreaming: such as the famous AIM model (Hobson et al. 2000), the neuropsychoanalysis 
of dreaming (Solms 2000), and more cognitive-functional approaches (Domhoff 2001). A second, 
although not entirely distinct, set of theories concerns the functional role of sleeping and dreaming: 
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from the early proposal of a “reverse learning” theory (Crick and Mitchison 1983) to the more updat-
ed “synaptic pruning” hypothesis (Tononi and Cirelli 2014), and the complementary idea of sleep as 
memory consolidation (Stickgold et al. 2001; Perogamvros and Schwartz 2012). Many researchers are 
also concerned with finding the specific evolutionary role of dreaming, rather than of sleep in general. 
Interesting proposals have been formulated over the last decades, such as the “threat simulation theo-
ry” (Revonsuo 2000; Valli and Revonsuo 2009) and its more recent version “social simulation theory” 
(Revonsuo et al. 2015). Generally speaking though, the idea of an evolutionary advantage of dreaming 
per se has been received with scepticism (Flanagan 1995; Flanagan 2000). Finally, another approach is 
focused on the developmental and cognitive aspects of dreaming: the analysis of dream reports high-
lighted a progressive enrichment in structure and length of children’s dreams (Foulkes 1999) as well as 
continuities between dream content and wakeful activities (Foulkes 1985; Domhoff 2011a).
This plethora of proposals highlights the difficulty in formulating a cohesive theory of dreaming. 
This is reflected by the early philosophical scepticism in regards to the topic (famously expressed by 
authors such as Malcolm 1959 and Dennett 1976). A recent comprehensive analysis of the field of 
dream research (Windt and Noreika 2011) pointed out the so-called “integration problem: the prob-
lem of how to integrate dreaming into broader theories of consciousness” (Windt and Noreika 2011, 
p. 1091) and, more generally speaking, of cognition.
Taking the integration problem as a springboard, we aim to give an account of dreaming through 
the lens of Predictive Processing (as proposed by Clark 2013, Clark 2016; Hohwy 2013) in order to 
provide a more comprehensive alternative to the present theoretical fragmentation. The paper will 
provide an overview of how sleep and dreaming are explained within the framework, focusing on 
pertaining issues and their possible solutions.
In order to do that, in the first section we will briefly recapitulate the main tenets of Predictive Pro-
cessing and illustrate the state of the art of this approach in dream research. We will give a definition 
of dreaming in Predictive Processing terms and highlight the main theoretical advantages offered by 
the framework.
In the second section, we will illustrate these theoretical advantages while tackling a weak spot in 
Predictive Processing: the explanation of phenomenal consciousness, with specific reference to the 
hard problem of consciousness (as formulated by Chalmers 1996). We will introduce Integrated In-
formation Theory (hereafter IIT, Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) as an example of a theoretical 
proposal that deals with the correlations between the phenomenal aspects of dreaming and the neural 
work of the sleeping brain. We will show that Predictive Processing and Integrated Information The-
ory share important analogies and theoretical points of contact, and therefore could be natural allies 
in providing a more detailed picture of how and why we dream. Afterwards, we will examine in more 
detail the evolutionary function of sleep according to Predictive Processing and Integrated Informa-
tion Theory and show why the latter identifies an evolutionary role for dreaming too.
In the final section, we will focus on two topics in dream research that can be promisingly inves-
tigated within the Predictive Processing framework in future studies. First, the role of the body in 
regards to dream formation, which can be accounted for by the predictive architecture proposed by 
Predictive Processing. Second, the specific role of the different sleep stages (REM and NREM) in the 
refinement of the predictive machinery: in order to resolve some ambiguity presented by the scientific 
literature, we will propose a two-step mechanism of refinement operating during sleep.
2  Dreaming in the Predictive Brain
2.1  What is Predictive Processing?
Predictive Processing (hereafter PP; see Clark 2013, Clark 2016; Hohwy 2013) is an emerging frame-
work in cognitive science, rooted in a vast and diverse scientific and philosophical literature (for a 
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summary, see Friston 2010; see also Clark 2013, pp. 181-186, for the historical antecedents). The main 
tenet of the framework is that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continu-
ously in the business of predicting their own internal states in relation to the external sensory input. 
This result is achieved through a combination of top-down flows of predictions and bottom-up flows 
of error signals. Predictions here are based on hypotheses construed on a generative model1 of the 
world, which tracks by means of Bayesian inferences the worldly causes behind the sensory input (for 
a detailed account of Bayesian statistics in this context see Hohwy 2013, ch. 1; see also Clark 2016, pp. 
301-303). This inferential process creates expectations (or priors) which guide prediction at each level 
of the cognitive hierarchy.
The hierarchical structure is the following: priors are organised from bottom levels (which track 
fast time-scale, perceptual details) to top levels (which track slow time-scale, abstract regularities) 
(Hohwy 2013, pp. 27-28). Predictions are streamed top-down (and laterally) and matched with the 
bottom-up sensory information. That first matching generates an amount of prediction error that in-
dicates how much the current prediction differs from the input. The prediction error is then streamed 
upward (forward) in the architecture, repeating the matching process at each level, through the mu-
tual informational exchange between error units and representation units (the latter being the carrier 
for the top-down predictions).
The goal of the whole system is to minimize the amount of prediction error (and the overall level of 
surprisal to the system), i.e. to generate successful predictions of its own states, ultimately correspond-
ing to successful inferences about the world (Clark 2013, p. 186; see also Hohwy 2013, pp. 51-53).
According to PP, therefore, brains are sophisticated neural networks that rely on statistical infer-
ences to produce the best prediction of the incoming sensory input and of their own internal states. 
The uncertainty of the signal from the environment (its reliability) is handled through a mechanism 
of assignment of expected precision to incoming input and gain regulation of the error units (Hohwy 
2013, pp. 64-66; Clark 2016, pp. 53-59). In other words, when the precision of the signal coming from 
the sensory input is judged as low, the gain on error units is also low and the brain relies more on its 
previously acquired priors. In other cases in which the signal is considered more precise, the gain is 
high and the brain relies more on the inputs. This process, in a nutshell, recapitulates the role of at-
tention in the hierarchical architectures described by PP: “Attention […] names the means or process 
by which an organism increases the gain (the weighting, hence the forward-flowing impact) on those 
prediction error units estimated to provide the most reliable sensory information relative to some 
current task, threat, or opportunity” (Clark 2016, pp. 59-60).
As stated above, the goal of the brain is to minimize the amount of prediction error generated in 
the system. According to PP there are two ways of achieving this goal. The first is to explain away the 
prediction error by deploying better predictions that fit the upcoming signal, i.e. perception. A second 
and complementary strategy is to modify the stream of sensory data so that it matches the predictions 
better. This is, in PP terms, action: actively seeking to match the predictions by interacting with the 
environment and sampling it through bodily movements, in order to produce or evoke the sensory 
consequences expected by the brain. But how is the mechanism of action implemented in the first 
place? In PP, proprioceptive predictions play a central role in determining actual bodily movement. 
Motor control, as Clark (Clark 2016, p. 121) puts it, is “subjunctive”: given a prediction of a non-actual 
proprioceptive state, the body will move accordingly in order to minimise prediction error.
According to the framework2 then, perception and action are two recurring and complementary 
strategies adopted by the brain to minimise prediction error. Their combination and cyclical succes-
sion — labelled “active inference” (Friston et al. 2011) — seem to be the very basis of our interaction 
1 A generative model “[…] aims to capture the statistical structure of some set of observed inputs by inferring a causal matrix able to give rise to that 
very structure” (Clark 2016, p. 21).
2 Clark (Clark 2013, Clark 2016), in this regard, proposes the label “action-oriented predictive processing” to differentiate from other approaches, like 
the one proposed by Hohwy , which do not place as much emphasis on the mechanism of active inference.
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with the world (Hohwy 2013, pp. 90-92; Clark 2016, pp. 120-124). According to the action-oriented 
formulation of PP the interaction with the environment is crucial in determining the specific quality 
and accuracy of our percepts. This becomes particularly relevant for the PP explanation of dreaming, 
as we shall see below.
2.2  The State of the Art: Neurobiology of Sleep According to Predictive Processing
Recent works by Hobson and Friston (Hobson and Friston 2012; Hobson and Friston 2014) sum-
marise the evidence in support of a PP explanation of dreaming and the labour of the sleeping brain.
In a nutshell, the idea is that “[…] the brain is essentially doing the same thing in sleep and waking; 
with one key difference — there is no sensory input during sleep. However, the recurrent hierarchical 
message passing is still in process; with continually changing expectations and hierarchical predic-
tions that constitute dream content.” (Hobson and Friston 2014, p. 8). In other words, the very same 
cognitive architecture that drives the perception-action loop when awake is still active during sleep, 
but devoid of the important role of environmental perceptual input and motor feedback.
Hobson and Friston base their view on the combination of the famous AIM model (Hobson et al. 
2000) and the free energy principle (Friston 2010)3. The AIM model makes use of a multidimensional 
state-space for keeping track of the brain’s changes in activation (A), input-output gating (I) and neu-
rochemical modulation (M). The shifts in parameters are mirrored by shifts in subjective experience. 
In particular, two positions in the state-space are relevant for their discussion: wake (characterised 
by high activation, externally driven processing and prevalently aminergic modulation) and REM 
sleep (characterised by high activation, internally driven processing and cholinergic modulation). 
The peculiar condition of the brain during REM sleep determines the formation of dreams and their 
sometimes bizarre and perceptually unstable narrative. During REM sleep, in fact, the change in neu-
rochemical modulation affects the input gating so to draw the attention of the brain from the sensory 
periphery to internally generated activations.
In PP terms this means that the stream of bottom-up sensory information is attenuated through 
the assignment of low precision, and the brain has to rely mainly on internally generated predictions 
(based on progressively more abstract, middle-to-high level priors) to carry out the task of minimiz-
ing prediction error (Clark 2016, pp. 98-102). To complete the picture, the specific activations of the 
brain during REM sleep are different from waking (Hobson and Friston 2014, pp. 9-10): activations 
of the primary visual and non-visual sensory cortices, the thalamocortical sensory system and basal 
forebrain explain the perceptual-like character of dreams. Particularly relevant in this context is the 
lack of activation of areas of the prefrontal cortex (deputed to executive functions), which would ex-
plain the diminished meta-cognitive awareness during dreams.
The motor cortex is still active and presumably deploying motor and proprioceptive predictions to 
engage in active inference; however, motor commands are inhibited at the pontine level, resulting in 
REM atonia and an effective paralysis of the body4. As a consequence, proprioceptive predictions can 
never be fully satisfied by proprioceptive feedback (as would happen during wake, when the strate-
gy of active inference would elicit actual movements in the environment), forcing the brain to jump 
from one prediction to another, determining the inconsistent nature of dream narrative. Of particular 
relevance in this context is the role of ponto-geniculate-occipital (PGO) waves, which originate in 
the brainstem and proceed all the way up to the visual cortex. Their presence is correlated with antic-
ipation and elicitation of ocular movements in both wake and REM sleep (Hobson and Friston 2012, 
pp. 85-90; Hobson and Friston 2014, p. 8). During wake, PGO waves peak in response to a change in 
peripheral vision (increase of surprisal), bringing about new predictions which need to be matched 
with the sensory stream in order to minimise prediction error. This in turn drives attention towards 
3  The free energy principle is a much more general theory that encompasses the PP proposal (see Clark 2016, pp. 305-306, for more details).
4  In fact, subjects affected by REM sleep behaviour disorder lack the blockade of motor output and “act” their dreams while asleep. 
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the (visual) sensory periphery and a motor prediction is issued from the motor cortex, which results 
in a saccade towards the origin of the input. This is a typical example of the perception-action loop in 
wake, a strategy that usually is effective in minimising prediction error. However, during REM sleep, 
the precision assigned to the bottom-up sensory stream of information is very low. PGO waves remain 
present though, as do ocular movements5. The system therefore has to make sense of randomly gen-
erated activations of several areas as well as the actual deployment of ocular movements to fit visual 
predictions without the aid of the fine-grained environmental feedback. In our understanding of PP, 
these conditions force the brain to rely only on its available middle-to-high level priors (which have a 
more abstract nature) for the formation of the perceptual scene (the dreamscape), since the low-level 
priors are flagged (via precision weighting) as unreliable. This means that the dreamscape will be pop-
ulated by objects that lack the fine-grained perceptual details and depth provided from the external 
environment during wake. Furthermore, these objects will be more likely to present bizarre and mixed 
features and the stability and continuity of the perceptual scene will be partially compromised. In the 
next section we will analyse the phenomenal aspects of dreaming in more details; for now, we argue 
that PP can account for the peculiar character of the phenomenal aspects of dreaming by linking it to 
the differences in the neural work during sleep. However, as we shall see later, this is not sufficient to 
explain why we dream in the first place.
It must be noted that the picture presented by Hobson & Friston is controversial insofar as it takes 
into account REM stages only to explain dreaming. However, it is now widely accepted in the dream 
research community that dream mentation can happen during NREM stages as well as during transi-
tional stages such as hypnagogia (onset of sleep) and hypnopompia (onset of wakefulness) (see Windt 
2015, pp. 50-56 and 530-550, for a detailed critique of transitional states), although they differ from 
REM dreams because they tend to be more similar to static images and they lack a narrative develop-
ment. Moreover, recent articles (Domhoff 2011b; Fox et al. 2013) that connect dreaming to other cog-
nitive phenomena instantiated by the default-mode network (DMN) put pressure on the neurological 
description provided above. A detailed analysis of the neurological details goes beyond the purpose 
of this paper: for example, the peculiar differences in content and vividness between NREM and REM 
sleep would deserve a separate discussion that accounts for the different occurrences of PGO waves. 
It is worth noticing, though, that the general architecture described by PP would be compatible with a 
theory of dreaming formation involving more widespread brain activations, as long as it doesn’t con-
tradict the main tenet of a predictive perception-action loop6 ongoing in the brain.
2.3  Dreaming in the Bayesian Brain: Theoretical Advantages of Predictive Processing
From the general description of PP and the analysis of the scientific literature explaining dreaming 
through the framework, we can now propose a clearer definition of what dreaming is in this context.
Dreaming =Df A process of hypothesis testing through perception-action loops under the con-
strained, altered neurophysiological conditions of sleep. 
The mechanism of prediction error minimization is always in place - but the conditions under which 
the mechanism operates are different. Therefore, it is arguable that the brain tries to instantiate the 
loop with the external environment, but fails to do so effectively. Without the important feedback of 
the external environment, the brain “runs wild” from one prediction to another, in accordance with 
the probability distribution among priors expressed by the generative model, while trying to make 
5 Extra-ocular muscles are one of the few groups of muscles barely affected by REM atonia.
6 The presence of a perception-action loop in dreams has not been widely discussed in the literature so far. A provisional suggestion is that the dream-
scape plays part of the role of the external environment, insofar as the dreamer “acts” in the dream world.
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sense of the (mostly) internally generated stream of information. As Windt (Windt 2015, p. 603) nice-
ly puts it, dreaming is “a process of mental improvisation”.
The PP explanation of dreaming has a clear theoretical advantage, in response to the integration 
problem mentioned above, insofar as it is by definition inclusive: it encompasses all forms of cognition 
under the same architecture and ongoing mechanism. PP therefore blurs the line between cognitive 
phenomena that were traditionally conceptualised as distinct: imagination, mind-wandering, dream-
ing, hallucinations, standard waking perception are all generated by the same predictive engine under 
different circumstances. In fact, as Clark puts it, “perceivers like us, if this is correct, are inevitably 
potential dreamers and imaginers too” (Clark 2012, p. 764). PP poses a necessary link between a set of 
potential cognitive phenomena that will arise from the specific Bayesian hierarchical architecture de-
scribed above, distinguishing itself as a particularly parsimonious framework, while at the same time 
retaining the ability to explain the specific character of each of those phenomena.
In the next section, we will examine two more theoretical advantages of PP. The first is that it pro-
vides a clear insight on the correlations between neural states and subjective experience in dreaming. 
This ties in directly with the explanation of consciousness. Why do we dream in the first place? We 
will introduce Integrated Information Theory (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) to address this 
question, showing the benefits of a comparison with PP. Secondly, PP is also a good framework in 
which to understand the evolutionary role of sleep and dreaming. To show this, we will provide an 
explanation of the advantageous mechanism of generative model optimisation operated during sleep 
that is compatible with the latest empirical evidence offered by sleep research. With the aid of IIT, we 
will also tackle the issue whether dreaming has an evolutionary role per se.
3  The Phenomenal Character of Dreaming
3.1  What Does it Feel like to Be Dreaming?
As seen above, during REM sleep the brain works under different conditions compared to wake. These 
conditions determine the resulting phenomenal character. The selective deactivation of large portions 
of the prefrontal cortex and the subsequent diminished meta-cognitive awareness contribute to the 
immersive nature of the dreaming experience. This picture led researchers to compare dreaming to a 
form of intensified mind-wandering (Fox et al. 2013, pp. 10-11). Indeed, in both cases the attention 
is drawn from the external input to internally generated stimuli, creating a form of (partial) seclusion 
from the environment. In PP terms, we may construe this as the assignment of low precision to the 
stream of information coming from the sensory periphery. It makes sense, phenomenally speaking, 
to compare mind-wandering to dreaming: while our mind strays from the present tasks, we feel im-
mersed in our own thoughts to the point that we lose contact with our surroundings and only direct, 
sudden or life-threatening stimuli bring us “back to reality”. During REM sleep, the physiological 
changes conspire to seclude us even more, raising the threshold for external stimuli to pass into the 
system.
This is far, however, from stating that the sleeping brain is totally disconnected from its environ-
ment. There are many cases in the literature that report integration of external stimuli into dreams. 
A study on the effect of somatosensory stimulation on dreaming (Sauvageau et al. 1998) provides an 
interesting example. For the study, the participants were monitored in a sleep lab and the stimulation 
was administered through the inflation of a blood pressure cuff fitted above the knees. Here is the 
dream report of one of the subjects upon awakening: “I was in our school gym bleachers. I decided to 
go join some gymnasts on the floor. It was really crowded with people; I’ve never seen so many. I was 
making my way through the crowd all out of breath and there was this big woman with a scarf. The 
scarf got hooked on my leg and I couldn’t get it off. I could feel it there; it didn’t hurt, but it bothered 
me that I couldn’t take it off.” (Sauvageau et al. 1998, p. 11, italics in original). From the PP perspec-
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tive, this would be a clear case of deployment of new predictions (the scarf wrapped around the leg) 
to match a stimulus that has passed the high threshold imposed by sleep (the pressure applied by the 
cuff). However, the functioning of the predictive hierarchy is still disrupted, from which follows the 
(wrong) attribution of the stimulus to the scarf. Please note that, although the origin of the stimulus 
is somehow explained away by the sleeping brain, it can be argued that a certain degree of error is still 
present, hence the emotional reaction of the dreamer (she is bothered that she could not take off the 
scarf).
The occasional dream oddities resulting from the integration of external stimuli are a case of a 
more general phenomenal feature: bizarreness (Scarone et al. 2008; Noreika et al. 2010). Although this 
feature is probably not as frequent as Hobson’s AIM model (which compares dreaming to a form of 
psychosis) would claim (see Domhoff 2007, for a critique), PP can also account for it. The brain relies 
on middle-to-high level priors which are more abstract in nature and it can’t match the resulting hy-
potheses with the informationally-rich stream of external sensory input. This generates a disruption 
in the “binding process” of dream content (Revonsuo and Tarkko 2002), resulting in oddities such as 
mixed features of objects and dream characters (like dreaming of a duck-winged man), and contextual 
displacement (i.e. people or objects appearing where they are not supposed to in a standard waking 
environment). It is worth noticing, however, that the study reports the presence of bizarreness in only 
about 50% of the reports analysed, and of these cases “only 37% concerned the internal features of the 
representation itself (structure and outlook, familiarity, semantic knowledge, temporal continuity)” 
(Revonsuo and Tarkko 2002, p. 14), the remaining cases being related to contextual bizarreness. In PP 
terms this could be interpreted, all in all, as a sign of the strong reliability of the generative model upon 
which predictions are based, albeit in impaired conditions.
Another salient phenomenological feature of REM dreams is their narrative development (Hobson 
et al. 2000; Nir and Tononi 2010). The narrative structure is overall (bizarreness aside) continuous and 
similar to waking experience, a fact reflected by the ability to report dreams in a narrative fashion. In 
PP terms this could be directly linked to the way organisms construct their own ongoing subjective 
experience - that is by deploying active inference. The sleeping brain does not simply process scat-
tered, random stimuli, but a constant flow of endogenous activations that it makes sense of through 
the aforementioned perception-action loop. It is not clear, however, how much of the cognitive archi-
tecture has to be in place and functioning to guarantee the presence of a cohesive narrative. NREM 
dreams are also widely reported, and although sometimes different in their content (more static, con-
ceptual, less vivid), they can also be narrative in nature. Hypnagogic hallucination seems to be a better 
case of dream-like imagery without a narrative (Nir and Tononi 2010, p. 94). Studying these cases 
might provide a good way to pinpoint the exact neuronal circuits that implement the active inference 
strategy in contrast to cases in which the brain simply “stands still” on the internally generated input.
PP’s explanation of dreaming has the potential to accommodate well the vast empirical literature 
on dream phenomenology and its neural substrate. However, there is still no indication in regards to 
why dreaming should be a form of conscious experience at all.
3.2  Why Doesn’t PP fully Explain Consciousness?
Since the formulation of the “hard-problem” of consciousness (Nagel 1974; Chalmers 1996), the ques-
tion of “why it feels like this, or like anything at all, to be something” has puzzled philosophers and 
scientists alike. In particular, Chalmers has proposed and discussed various arguments against phys-
icalism, either casting doubts on the (nomological, logical, or metaphysical) supervenience of phe-
nomenal properties on physical properties, or arguing against their identity with them, given the 
impossibility of deducing all truths about phenomenal facts from the complete knowledge of truths 
about physical facts (Chalmers 1996). The problem concerning phenomenal consciousness becomes 
even more evident in the case of dreaming: while it might make some sense, at least evolutionarily 
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speaking, to be able to have subjective experiences during wake in order to better cope with the en-
vironment, it is not immediately evident why we should experience the internally generated world of 
dreams instead of simply shutting down (phenomenally speaking) for a few hours per night.
Tentative solutions to the hard problem have been advanced in the PP literature. Hobson & Friston 
(Hobson and Friston 2014) and Hobson et al. (Hobson et al. 2014) equate consciousness to a form of 
active inference, while appealing to a “Cartesian theatre” metaphor to account for the connection be-
tween the labour of the brain and the subjective phenomenology. It is not clear, however, in what sense 
their proposal would protect the PP framework from the classical zombie objection (a system might 
have all the functional and behavioural properties of a conscious system, but no internal subjective 
experience)7.
Hohwy proposes that “conscious perception is determined by the hypotheses about the world that 
best predicts input and thereby gets the highest posterior probability.” However, he continues, “[…] 
this is not intended as a proposal that can explain why perceptual states are phenomenally conscious 
rather than not.” (Hohwy 2013, pp. 201-202). In other words, Hohwy aims to explain precisely which 
specific representational content (among the many predictions elaborated by the brain) generates a 
subjective phenomenal experience, how the latter is generated and under which conditions. Interest-
ingly, he later proposes to connect this to the Global Neuronal Workspace theory developed by Baars 
and Dehaene (Hohwy 2013, pp. 211-214). This proposal seems to suggest that only a small part of the 
information processed by the hierarchical architecture flows into consciousness, or in other words 
that consciousness is composed of/emerges from a series of subpersonal, subconscious processes.
On the same line, Clark suggests that Predictive Processing might be on the right track to begin to 
solve the hard problem (Clark 2016, p. 239). By explaining all the components of conscious experience, 
such as the sense of self, the sense of presence, agency, emotions, as well as the perceptual milieu and 
other cognitive features (imagination, dreaming and the like) under the same predictive architecture, 
PP is in a sense dissolving the hard problem piece by piece. However, Clark notes: “True believers in 
the hard problem will say that all we can make progress with using these new-fangled resources is the 
familiar project of explaining patterns of response and judgment, and not the very existence of experi-
ence itself.” (Clark 2016, p. 324). This PP solution would work only for detractors of the hard problem 
(Dennett 2013). We want to remain agnostic on this point, and propose an alternative approach that 
tries to face the hard problem directly: Integration Information Theory (IIT).
3.3  Integrated Information Theory: What it Is
IIT (Tononi 2008; Tononi 2012; Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi and Koch 2015; Tononi 2015; Tononi et al. 
2016) attempts to account for consciousness by linking the phenomenological evidence we get from 
our own experience to the evidence provided in the last decades by cognitive neuroscience. In fact, IIT 
maintains that in order to solve the hard problem of consciousness a change of perspective is needed: 
“[A]s long as one starts from the brain and asks how it could possibly give rise to experience [...] the 
problem may be not only hard, but almost impossible to solve. But things may be less hard if one takes 
the opposite approach: start from consciousness itself, by identifying its essential properties, and then 
ask what kinds of physical mechanisms could possibly account for them. This is the approach taken by 
integrated information theory (IIT)” (Tononi and Koch 2015, p. 5).
The theory starts by identifying the properties of conscious experience (which are described as “ax-
ioms”) and establishes connections with properties of the physical system that supports them (“pos-
tulates”). Each axiom about phenomenal experience has a corresponding postulate about the physical 
substrate (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016). The first axiom is intrinsic existence: experience 
exists, it is actual, undeniable, self-evident, and intrinsic, namely independent of external observers or 
7 For a critical discussion of these ideas, see Dołęga & Dewhurst (Dołega and Dewhurst 2015) and response from Hobson & Friston (Hobson and 
Friston 2016).
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objects. This axiom constitutes the starting point of IIT and corresponds to the Cartesian assumption 
that conscious experience is a given, a self-evident and indubitable truth. The corresponding postu-
late claims that the system supporting such experience must exist “intrinsically”, namely must have 
cause-effect power upon itself8. 
The second axiom, composition, claims that the structure of experience is composed of multiple 
(higher-order) “phenomenological” distinctions, namely different aspects of each individual experi-
ence (such as the perception of various objects seen in the visual field, their shape, parts, colour, exten-
sion, etc.). The corresponding postulate claims that the system must be composed of sets of elements 
with cause-effect power within the system, forming a structure of mechanisms of different order that 
corresponds to the structure of phenomenal experience. 
The third axiom, information, states that conscious experience is specific and that every conscious 
state is informative, inasmuch as it identifies specific sets of phenomenological distinctions and differ-
entiates from (rules out) other possible experiences. The corresponding postulate states that the sys-
tem must specify a cause-effect structure, roughly the repertoire of activation states of the mechanisms 
that compose the system, which characterizes the cause-effect profile of such states and differentiates 
it from other possible ones. 
The integration axiom claims that conscious experience is unified and irreducible to its component 
phenomenological distinctions (i.e. experience comes as a whole, the experience of a blue book is not 
reducible to the experience of a colourless book plus the experience of the colour blue, nor they can 
be experienced separately). The postulate states that the cause-effect structure specified by the system 
must be unified and intrinsically irreducible to the one specified by non-interdependent sub-systems 
obtained by unidirectional partitions (namely a partition that is unable to affect and be affected by the 
activity of other parts of the system). The degree of intrinsic irreducibility is measured as integrated 
information (Φ), which quantifies the changes in the cause-effect structure of a system when the sys-
tem is partitioned. 
Finally, the exclusion axiom claims that consciousness has a definite spatio-temporal grain, and that 
there is only one conscious subject at a time (which cannot have parts or be part of a bigger subject). 
The corresponding postulate claims that the cause-effect structure of a system must be definite: it is 
specified over the set of elements that is maximally irreducible from its intrinsic perspective, hence 
having the highest level of integrated information (ΦMAX) among all its sub-systems or the systems that 
comprise it.
Starting from these axioms and postulates, IIT describes the phenomenology of consciousness 
as constituted by the sum of informational relationships among activation states of the system. The 
cause-effect repertoire, or qualia space, is defined as a high-dimensional space with one axis for each 
possible past and future state of the system in which a structure of concepts can be represented (Tononi 
2012). Qualia are sets of informational relationships in high Φ-level generating systems, or maximal-
ly irreducible cause-effect repertoires, called “concepts”, generated by a complex of elements. Φ here 
represents the measure for intrinsic irreducibility called integrated information. Φ also quantifies how 
the cause-effect structure changes when the system is partitioned. In fact, the greatest role is played 
by what Tononi calls maximally irreducible conceptual structures (MICS). A conceptual structure is 
a constellation of points in concept space, where each axis is a possible past/future state of the set of 
elements, and each point is a concept specifying differences that make a difference within the set.
Besides axioms and postulates, IIT posits a central identity: every experience is identical with a 
conceptual structure that is maximally irreducible intrinsically, namely with a MICS (Tononi et al. 
2016). In particular, the “quality” of the experience - its content of phenomenal distinctions - is spec-
8 Causal power is a condition for existence, and cause-effect power upon itself is a condition for the existence of a system independent of external 
observers. Tononi writes: “in order to exist, [a system] must have cause-effect power, as there is no point in assuming that something exists if nothing 
can make a difference to it, or if it cannot make a difference to anything. Moreover, to exist from its own intrinsic perspective, independent of external 
observers, a system of elements in a state must have cause-effect power upon itself, independent of extrinsic factors.” (Tononi 2015, p. 4164).
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ified by the form of the conceptual structure (by the concepts and their relationship in cause-effect 
space), whereas the “quantity” of the experience - its level - is given by its irreducibility (ΦMAX), i.e. the 
quantity of integrated information of the MICS. IIT therefore posits an identity between integrated 
information in a system and conscious phenomenal experience. This equals to say that, if a system 
satisfies the requirements for having a non-null-quantity of Φ, it will be conscious by definition.
3.4  Integrated Information Theory: How it Helps
IIT makes a number of predictions concerning the neural processes fundamental for consciousness 
and their impairment in pathological and altered (i.e. non-standard waking) conditions (Casali et al. 
2013). In particular, perturbational studies using TMS (Transcranial magnetic stimulation) as a meth-
od of breaking down cortical connectivity and reactivity (and therefore, the level of ΦMAX in the brain) 
have shown that in REM sleep (Massimini et al. 2009; Massimini et al. 2010) and some instances of 
NREM sleep (Nieminen et al. 2016) the level of integrated information in the brain is high enough 
for exhibiting conscious experience (dreams, reported upon awakening). On the contrary, extensive 
cortical connectivity breakdowns (as the ones happening during slow-wave sleep and anaesthesia) 
impair the system to the point where no global conscious experience is possible. What this means is 
that waking-like consciousness does not appear in such cases, but few sub-complexes could still lead 
to limited phenomenal experience9. This fits nicely with PP insofar as only certain areas of the brain 
might be sufficient in order to produce conscious experience, but at the same time the variations in 
the stream of information available to minimise prediction error determines variations in phenome-
nal experience, due to reliance on different priors. It also accounts for NREM dreams in regards to the 
different phenomenal content described above: more sparse activations during NREM stages would 
result in segregated information, but the local maxima might still be sufficient for static, non-narrative 
perceptual-like mentation.
Moreover, IIT states that the brain is organized like a device for “interpreting” spatial and tempo-
ral correlations representative of the causal structure of the environment, in the light of its memories 
(stored in connections). This causal structure is incorporated in the connectivity of the system via 
natural selection and learning mechanisms. IIT calls matching the measure of how well the integrated 
conceptual structure generated by an adapted complex fits or “matches” the cause-effect structure of 
its environment (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi 2012). In other words, IIT tries to account for the adap-
tation of the cognitive structures and behaviour of biological organisms (and artificial systems) to the 
environment. This is reminiscent of the PP description of the role of the generative model (what IIT 
calls the “integrated conceptual structure”): the process of increasing the matching value can be seen 
as equivalent to the refinement of the generative model10. This is achieved by a progressive reorgani-
sation of priors (concepts or structure of concepts, in IIT terminology) via learning and, as we shall 
see below, sleep.
Given the assumption of the identity between consciousness and integrated information, IIT pre-
dicts that conscious experience must correspond to the high levels of Φ measured during REM sleep 
(Massimini et al. 2010) and NREM sleep (Nieminen et al. 2016), we suggest that PP might benefit 
9 This view implies that when the level of Φ of the whole system becomes lower than the level of Φ of some of its parts, the main conscious subject 
ceases to exist, but other subjects (corresponding to the new sub-complexes with maxima of Φ) come into existence. The issue concerning this con-
sequence of the theory deserves deeper analysis, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, but its discussion should nonetheless be of top priority if 
IIT were to be a complete theory of consciousness.
10 As suggested by Metzinger (personal communication), there is a long-standing debate on the possibility that adaptive mechanisms will lead to self-de-
ception rather than an accurate modelling of the world. It is therefore debatable to what extent the mechanisms described by both PP and IIT will 
lead to a good mapping of the causal structure of the world. A full discussion of the topic goes beyond the purpose of this paper; it will suffice to say 
that the convergence of descriptions of mechanisms between PP and IIT remains valid independently from the actual product of these mechanisms 
(whether it would be accurate or adaptive but self-deceptive). For further reading on the topic, see Von Hippel and Trivers 2011; for a discussion of 
self-deception in the light of PP, see Pliushch 2017.
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from assuming a similar non-eliminativist position in regards to phenomenal aspects of conscious-
ness and the hard problem.
It could be argued that IIT has several problems on its own. There is no space here for a thorough 
critique of the theory, but a relevant objection in this context is that it does not really solve the hard 
problem. In fact, the solution proposed by the theory comes from the assumption of the fundamen-
tal identity between consciousness and integrated information (more precisely, maximally irreduc-
ible conceptual structures). This solution constitutes a third way of responding to the hard problem, 
different from both classic dualism and reductive/eliminativist physicalism. As seen above, different 
versions of PP have different degrees of resistance to the hard problem and consequently different de-
grees of compatibility with IIT. The analysis offered in this paper justifies the provisional assumption 
that a connection between the two theories is feasible and potentially fruitful. Despite a more detailed 
analysis is needed, the similarities in the conceptual vocabulary used by IIT and PP allow for a direct 
comparison between the two theories.
 In the next section, we will turn to another theoretical advantage of PP, that is the explanation of 
the evolutionary role of sleep. With the support of IIT, we will later argue for an evolutionary role of 
dreaming as well.
4  The Evolutionary Role of Sleep and Dreaming
4.1  The “Synaptic Homoeostasis Hypothesis”
The evolutionary role of sleep and dreaming has been an object of discussion among the scientific 
community for a long time. It is not evidently clear why an organism should, for at least some time a 
day, stop doing evolutionarily advantageous activities (like foraging for food) and become potentially 
vulnerable to predators. However, there is an increasing amount of evidence that points in the direc-
tion of a cognitive benefit deriving from sleep.
A particularly relevant proposal (independent from but compatible with IIT) has been advanced by 
Tononi & Cirelli (Tononi and Cirelli 2014) in a recent review of the state of the art in neurobiology: the 
“synaptic homoeostasis hypotheses” (SHY). SHY claims that sleep is a way to improve overall synaptic 
organisation and restore energetic equilibrium (homoeostasis) in the brain. During wake, our brains 
constantly form new synaptic pathways and neuronal connections, strengthening them in response to 
the stimuli from the environment. However, the brain’s resources are limited and neural plasticity takes 
its toll: over time the energetic expense for synaptic maintenance, combined to synaptic saturation 
and decreased signal-to-noise ratio will become disadvantageous. This explains the presence of sleep: 
according to SHY, during slow wave sleep (i.e. NREM stages 3 and 4) the combination of synaptic de-
potentiation (triggered by cholinergic neuromodulation) and spontaneous activation throughout the 
brain contributes to an overall downgrading and optimisation of the synapses and, as a consequence, 
the restoration of synaptic homoeostasis. This process is called “activity-dependent down-selection” 
(Tononi and Cirelli 2014, p. 15). During wake, the brain searches for potential statistical regularities in 
the environment (repetitive and suspicious coincidence in the sensory input) and potentiates synapses 
accordingly. The stronger the regularities, the stronger the synaptic bonds. However, noise too could 
drive synaptic formation, thus leading to maladaptive connections and over-fitting of the model in 
the long run, since the waking brain will continue to form new synaptic connections in order to grasp 
all the possible regularities in the environment. During slow wave sleep, the brain operates a general 
connective depotentiation through low frequency diffused activations in neuromodulatory conditions 
that promote synaptic depression (Tononi and Cirelli 2014, p. 19). The strongest connections (i.e. the 
one representing the strongest regularities learned while awake) will be less affected, resulting there-
fore in a relative reinforcement and subsequent increase in signal-to-noise ratio. To give a simplified 
example of this, think of two different sets of connections, the first (representing strong regularities) 
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with value n and the second (representing weaker ones) with value n-2. If the downgrading operates 
on a -3 factor, over time the weaker connections will be deleted, leaving only the stronger (more adap-
tive) ones in place and more room for new connections (learning) upon awakening.
This process contribute to a better consolidation of previous useful information while integrating it 
in long-time learning schemes, and systematically protecting it from noise interference (by forgetting 
noise-related connections). Finally, the “gist extraction” of important regularities from the environ-
ment is ultimately improved (Tononi and Cirelli 2014, pp. 21-23).
4.2  Over-Fitting Avoidance and Optimisation of the Generative Model
The mechanism described by SHY bears striking similarities to the PP account of the evolutionary role 
of sleep. Hobson & Friston (Hobson and Friston 2012), in response to the apparently non-adaptive 
loss of thermoregulation during REM stages, propose that this is nonetheless a necessary step in order 
to reduce the general complexity of the generative model and avoid over-fitting. This idea has roots in 
the “wake-sleep algorithm” proposed by Hinton (Hinton et al. 1995). The mechanism is simple: during 
wake the system learns new things (optimising posterior beliefs), but over time its generative model 
of the world becomes overly-complex, incapable of distinguishing between meaningful signal and 
noise. A second phase is therefore needed: “During sleep, the brain’s model is insulated from further 
sensory testing but can still be improved by simplification and streamlining. […] Sleep may thus allow 
the brain to engage in synaptic pruning so as to improve (make more powerful and generalizable) […] 
the generative model” (Clark 2016, p. 101). This “synaptic pruning” (i.e. removal of redundant, weak 
connections) is precisely what SHY describes as happening during NREM sleep.
We will discuss the different roles of REM and NREM stages of sleep in the optimisation of the 
generative model in the next section. For now, let’s turn back to dreaming.
4.3  Are Dreams Adaptive?
We showed that PP provides an elegant and rich explanation for the adaptive role of sleeping. But 
what about sleep mentation (like REM dreaming or hypnagogic imagery)? Does it have an evolution-
ary role or is it just a “spandrel of sleep” (Flanagan 1995)? In the light of the discussion above, there are 
two main reasons to believe that dreaming has an adaptive value.
First, provided that assuming a convergence between PP and IIT is fruitful, the identity postulated 
between integrated information and consciousness suffices to establish that sleep mentation is a form 
of conscious experience, insofar as the adaptive neural mechanism ongoing during sleep implies high 
levels of Φ. More generally, it seems that in this context the question about an evolutionary role of 
dreaming per se is ill-conceived: given that the level of integrated information in a system depends on 
the structure of the system itself, a structure that has a clear evolutionary advantage in sleep, it makes 
poor sense to distinguish between the two. The question of what is the evolutionary role of dreaming 
(if there is any) is then linked to the more general question of what is the evolutionary role of con-
sciousness.
Second, and in support to the previous point, “IIT predicts that adaptation to an environment 
should lead to an increase in matching and thereby to an increase in consciousness.” (Tononi 2015). 
This means that an increase in matching, or in PP terms the optimisation of the generative model, is 
strictly connected to a wider and richer phenomenal repertoire (a higher value of Φ). Studies on adap-
tive logic-gate networks, or animats (Albantakis et al. 2014), have shown that over the course of their 
adaptation, integrated information increases with respect to task fitness and matches the complexity 
of the environment. Although this form of task-dependent fitness was tested exclusively online, it is 
plausible that in much more complicated neural networks like our brains the sleep phase contributes 
to the same ultimate result: increase in matching. Given that dreaming is the inevitable phenomenal 
aspect of this procedure (for during both REM and NREM dreams the level of Φ is high enough, see 
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§3.4), it makes no sense to ask for an evolutionary role disconnected from the neural processes that 
give raise to it.
In sections 3 and 4 we have shown in depth what we think are two important theoretical advantag-
es of adopting PP in the study of dreaming, discussing the possible issues arising. In the next section 
we will outline two open problems in dream research and we will suggest that they can be fruitfully 
re-examined through the lens of Predictive Processing, 
5  Two Avenues of Research for the Future
5.1  The Dreaming Body: Is Dreaming an Exclusively Internal/Off-Line Simulation?
Dreaming has often been referred to in the literature as a form of cranial-bound, off-line, disembodied 
experience. Windt (Windt 2015, pp. 350-354) neatly sums up this position as the “functional-disem-
bodiment hypothesis”, according to which the sleeping-body inputs and motor outputs are discon-
nected from the phenomenal experience presented in dreams. This hypothesis could be interpreted 
as assimilating dreaming either to a radical form of cranial envatment or to a particularly vivid case 
of imagination. Indeed, the very depiction of dreaming by Hobson & Friston presented in the first 
section of this paper seems to fall in line with it. This position, although widespread, has limited scope 
since it does not account for phenomena like the integration of external stimuli and, more generally, 
the role of the complex dynamics in the body while asleep.
However, we want to suggest that this position does not represent PP in its entirety. In fact, a 
growing body of literature within the framework seems to indicate that bodily predictions are almost 
always in place. As suggested by Seth (Seth 2013), interoceptive predictions (i.e. predictions about 
the states of our own internal organs, muscular and visceral sensations, hunger, pain, breathing, etc.) 
constitute the basis for our sense of conscious presence in the world and the building blocks for the 
formation of a rich, embodied conscious experience. Arguably, proprioceptive predictions (i.e. pre-
dictions about the position of our body in space) might play a role too, in particular for what concerns 
vestibular positioning and motion (Dharani 2005). Even emotions, explained as arising from a com-
bination of interoceptive predictions (as described above) and cognitive ones (how we are “supposed 
to feel” about our own body reactions) (Clark 2016, pp. 231-235), might play a role inasmuch as they 
constitute a conspicuous part of dreaming phenomenology.
Bodily predictions, according to PP, are therefore an important part of the cognitive hierarchy 
and the study of their neural instantiation should provide a better insight of why dream phenome-
nology has a “diminished” embodied flavour. Interestingly, a recent study (Windt et al. 2014) used 
lucid dreams as a condition to explore the subjective difference between self-tickling (usually ineffec-
tive) and being tickled by another (usually intense). During wake condition, this pattern of subjective 
difference was respected. The results in the lucid dreaming condition indicate however that a form 
of sensory attenuation is in place: in spite of the dreamer “commanding” other dream characters to 
tickle her, the subjective feeling is almost indistinguishable from self-tickling in intensity. Interpreted 
through the lens of PP (Clark 2016, pp. 112-114), the impossibility of self-tickling is due to the in-
clusion of motor commands issued for the tickling itself into predictions of the sensory output, thus 
leading to a general sensory attenuation. The results of the lucid dreaming experiment indicate that 
bodily predictions are still in place during sleep. However, “a strong conviction driving these effects 
in lucid dreams might be that to the extent that one is able to control an agent, this agent cannot be 
fully distinct from oneself ” (Windt et al. 2014, p. 7). The authors here refer explicitly to the presence of 
hyperpriors that guide body-ownership attribution — and those hyperpriors, in the case of dreaming, 
would be among the ones leading predictions, in the absence of reliable sensory input.
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Following this, we do not want to suggest that dreams are fully embodied experience, but rather 
support the proposal that “dreams are weakly functionally embodied states” (Windt 2015, p. 383): 
bodily predictions, especially in the form of high-level priors, are still present during dreaming, there-
fore it would be inappropriate to think about it as a form of disembodied mentation. More generally 
speaking, PP helps rethinking dreaming as yet another particular state in which the cognitive archi-
tecture operates: one that shuts off the environment but only up to a certain threshold, and that doesn’t 
cancel out the role of the body in the formation of the dreamscape. Future empirical research are 
needed in order to establish exactly how “weak” this functional embodiment is.
5.2  Synaptic Pruning or Synaptic Strengthening? The Exact Role of Sleep Stages in 
the Optimisation of the Generative Model
Recall from section 4.2 that according to both SHY and PP, sleep serves a role of optimisation of 
the generative model via global activity-dependent down-selection. However, the supporters of SHY 
claim that this synaptic pruning is mainly operated during slow wave sleep, while Hobson & Friston 
(Hobson and Friston 2012) focus their attention on REM sleep. Given the current state of the evi-
dence provided, it is still unclear when exactly the optimisation is conducted. Interestingly, a recent 
controversy (Heller 2014 and response by Cirelli and Tononi 2015) puts pressure on the general pic-
ture drawn by SHY: some studies suggest that sleep does involve synaptic potentiation and strength-
ening as mechanisms of memory consolidation. There is indeed a broad literature about the role of 
both NREM and REM sleep in memory evolution, recombination and integration in mental schemes 
(Stickgold and Walker 2013). The reward system also seems to play an important part in this respect, 
explaining the highly emotional character of REM dreams (Perogamvros and Schwartz 2012; Perog-
amvros and Schwartz 2013).
More empirical research is needed to set the debate. Our tentative proposal is to consider the dif-
ferent stages as performing two different but complementary functions: NREM sleep would operate 
synaptic pruning, while REM sleep would strengthen the connections via randomly generated, wake-
like levels of activity. This would make sense if we think that a continuous depotentiation overnight 
would deplete the brain of possibly useful but freshly formed (therefore, weak) synapses. Alternating 
NREM synaptic pruning to REM synaptic reinforcement would avoid that loss. Additionally, rein-
forcement during REM sleep would be conducted without the noise disturbance of the bottom-up 
sensory stream but only among middle-to-high level priors, leading to a better internal coherence of 
the generative model. The optimisation would be thus conducted via a “two-steps mechanism” that 
alternates overnight. Interestingly, this idea has been already proposed in the scientific literature: Giu-
ditta and colleagues (Giuditta et al. 1995) talked about a “sequential hypothesis” (SH) of the function 
of sleep. In their view, mostly related to the positive effects of sleep on memory consolidation, slow-
wave (NREM) sleep would serve as a preliminary mechanism of general depotentiation and simul-
taneous flagging of memories, while REM sleep would help to store and potentiate those important 
memories. We argue that SH can be easily meshed with PP. A two-steps mechanism, as suggested 
above, would also be compatible with SHY, as the authors themselves admit (Tononi and Cirelli 2014, 
p. 27). However, it must be noted that in a more recent paper Giuditta (Giuditta 2014) remarks im-
portant differences between SH and SHY on several points: the energetic needs and the nature of the 
activity of the brain, the methodological approaches to support the respective claims, and the role of 
REM stages in memory consolidation. Establishing the exact function of each stage of sleep is import-
ant, from PP’s perspective, to understand their variation in length over the ontogeny and their possible 
role in the early development of the generative model (Segawa 1999; Hobson 2009). More research is 
needed to figure out the exact neurological mechanisms and processes: we suggest that the adoption 
of PP would be a profitable way to frame the future research in order to overcome the differences be-
tween competing hypotheses.
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6  Conclusion
This paper aimed to provide an overview of the understanding of sleep and dreaming within the 
Predictive Processing framework. We described three theoretical advantages in adopting PP. First, 
it is an integrative, inclusive framework, insofar as it explains several cognitive phenomena under 
the same cognitive architecture. Second, it has a good grip on the phenomenal aspects of dreaming. 
Third, it provides a clear and elegant explanation of the evolutionary role of sleep. In relation to the 
last two aspects, we observed that PP still lacks a good answer to the hard-problem of consciousness 
and suggested a possible merging with Integrated Information Theory. We showed the terminological 
and conceptual affinities between the two theories and the solution that IIT offers in response to the 
hard-problem and to the question about whether dreaming has a specific evolutionary role, the strat-
egy of starting from the phenomenal aspects of consciousness and their explanation in terms of inte-
grated information. If our proposal proves to be theoretically robust, it might serve as a springboard 
for a more general theory of cognition that includes an explanation of consciousness. In the final 
section, we illustrated two topics for future research to focus on at the intersection of PP and dream 
studies. We think that they could provide mutual and helpful clarification to both fields.
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